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Abstract - We investigate the political determinants of liberalization in OECD network industries, 
performing a panel estimation over thirty years, through the largest and most updated sample 
available. Contrary to traditional ideological cleavages, we find that right-wing governments 
liberalize less than left-wing ones. This result is confirmed when controlling for the existing 
regulatory conditions that executives find when elected. Furthermore, governments’ heterogeneity, 
proportional electoral rules, and European Union membership all show positive and statistically 
significant effects on liberalization. Our findings suggest that, despite the conventional wisdom, the 
political-economic rationale behind liberalization paths in network industries is far from being 
assessed. 
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1.  Introduction1 
 
One of the distinguishing features of the last three decades has been the wave of 
market-oriented policies experienced worldwide (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006; 
Armstrong and Sappington, 2006; Guriev and Megginson, 2007; Pitlik, 2007).  
In particular, in network industries, which cover crucial sectors for national economies 
such as passenger air transport, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail and 
road, privatization and liberalization are among the market-oriented policies which 
registered the largest convergence across OECD countries. 
Beside the analysis of economic determinants (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; Levy and 
Spiller, 1996; Newbery, 1997; 2002; Armstrong and Sappington, 2006), a large group 
of scholars have investigated the role of institutional and political determinants of 
market-oriented policy in network industries, following the ‘political economics’ 
approach (Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Persson, 2002; Besley and Case, 2003; Besley, 
Persson and Sturm, 2010).  
While the political economy of privatization in network industries has been largely 
investigated and measured, little of this literature, with some relevant exceptions, 
addresses the role of political parties and institutions as determinants of liberalization 
policy.  
In this paper we attempt to fill this gap, analyzing liberalization policies over the last 
three decades in seven OECD network industries, whose relevance is crucial both in 
terms of their impact on per capita consumption and as suppliers of intermediate 
inputs (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006). Liberalization here refers mainly to policy aimed 
at reducing economic, institutional and legal barriers to entry in sectors previously 
dominated by legal state-owned monopolies and in which access to essential facility 
networks is crucial to develop downstream competition.  
Our research aims at addressing the following questions: Do right-wing governments 
support liberalization in network industries more than left-wing ones? Do left-wing 
governments abstain from liberalization policies in network industries in the same vein 
as they are deemed to do with privatization? Furthermore, since partisan competition 
                                                 
1 We would like to thank for previous discussions on the issue or comments, SIMONA BENEDETTINI, 
CARLO CAMBINI, PHILIPPE MARTIN, EMANUELA MICHETTI, FABIO PADOVANO, PIER LUIGI PARCU, V. 
VISCO COMANDINI, STEFAN VOIGT. Usual disclaimers apply. We kindly acknowledge financial support 
by REFGOV.  
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could be heightened or stifled by different political institutions (Milner, and Judkins, 
2004), other related issues need to be addressed in addition to the above fundamental 
questions: Does partisanship matter for liberalization policy when controlling for the 
political institutions in which parties and governments are embedded, such as the 
nature of electoral rules, the constitutional system of governments, the parliamentary 
system and the homogeneity of the governing coalitions? Does policy diffusion, such 
as European Union membership, affect the decision and timing of liberalization in 
network industries (Levi-Faur, 2003; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Clifton, Comin and 
Diaz Fuentes, 2006; Pitlik, 2007)? 
Our analysis is based on the largest updated data set available, provided by the latest 
releases of ETCR economic indicators for liberalization (OECD, 2009) and by political 
indicators of the World Bank’s Database of Political Institutions (World Bank, 2009). 
This allows us to consider a larger group of countries and a longer period of time with 
respect to previous empirical studies (e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010). In particular, 
we perform a panel analysis on a sample of 30 OECD countries over the 1975-2006 
period, and circumvent omitted variable bias and endogeneity problems by estimating 
a time/country fixed effects lag-model. Our results, firstly, reveal that left-wing 
governments have been more active in promoting liberalization policies than right-
wing ones. Secondly, they suggest that the traditional claim of right-wing 
governments to be the biggest promoters of market-oriented policies may need to be 
reconsidered when the deregulation process is analyzed in its entire accomplishment 
from the Seventies to date. 
Moreover, our analysis reveals that government heterogeneity and proportional 
electoral systems show a positive and statistically significant effect on the decision to 
liberalize. Also European Union membership, which had almost no influence as a 
driver for liberalization in previous empirical studies (see, e.g., Potrafke, 2010), in our 
analysis turns out to positively affect, in a statistically significant way, the intensity of 
liberalization policies. In addition, adoption of the euro currency shows a statistical 
significant effect on liberalization in network industries, as pointed out by Høj, 
Galasso, Nicoletti and Dang (2006). Finally, a strong path-dependency is found for 
OECD liberalization patterns, as past deregulation initiatives not only show a 
remarkable ‘ratchet effect’ but also seem to generate a positive attitude in governments 
towards launching new liberalization programs.  
The evidence we find thus provides Political Economy with the puzzle of giving  
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reasons for the hitherto neglected left-wing liberalization trend observed in network 
industries. Commenting our results, we briefly outline five main alternative 
motivations for a left-wing liberalization rationale in network industries:  
a) liberalization as the result of crossing ideological divides and/or policy diffusion;  
b) liberalization as a ‘policy reversal’;  
c) liberalization as a signal towards swing voters under political competition;  
d) liberalization as a weak, institutionally determined, market-oriented policy; 
e) liberalization as a ‘new’ left-wing policy. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that, in this paper, we do not attempt to single out from the 
above any dominant interpretation for our findings, neither do we seek to provide a 
theory for left-wing versus right-wing parties’ preferences for liberalization. We simply 
claim that our findings reverse the conventional argument that right-wing 
governments and majoritarian (plurality or ‘winner takes all’) electoral systems should 
always, and systematically, implement market-oriented policy more than do left-wing 
governments and proportional electoral systems, as generally deemed to be the case in 
the empirical literature so far. We conclude that partisanship and political institutions 
matter for liberalization. But the analysis of the political rationale and the institutional 
determinants behind deregulation of network industries is still in its infancy and 
further research is needed to properly address the results and the stylized facts we 
outline.  
Two caveats arise: we do not explore whether political parties properly reflect, in their 
liberalization choices, the interests of their constituents; and we do not measure 
economic liberalization outcomes such as prices, market structure, investments and so 
on.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we briefly review the existing empirical 
literature on the institutional and political determinants of market-oriented policies 
and show how comparing the results reached so far in the literature with stylized facts 
on liberalization, raises new puzzles. In Section 3 we describe our data and empirical 
strategy, while in Section 4 we summarize our main results. Section 5 discusses our 






2. Partisanship and Market-oriented Policy: Results, 
Stylized Facts and Puzzles 
 
Market-oriented policies have been defined in various ways (Heckelman and Knack, 
2005) and generally include many policy tools such as the security of property rights 
(Knack and Keefer, 1995; Trebilcock and Daniels, 2008), openness to trade (Sachs and 
Warner, 1995; Frankel and Romer, 2000), labor and product market regulation 
(Loayza, Oviedo and Serven, 2005), and privatization and liberalization of network 
industries (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003; Conway and Nicoletti, 2006).  
We devote here our attention to the literature on the political and institutional 
determinants of privatization and liberalization policies in network industries. 
 
 
A. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
A theory of political determinants of market-oriented policy has been formulated by 
Biais and Perotti (2002)  who focus on partisan privatization choice within the 
framework of the median voter problem (Downs, 1957). In the considered framework, 
political parties compete on their economic policies, which include taxation, 
redistribution and privatization, to gain median voters’ consent. Privatization by right-
wing parties acts as a way of co-opting an otherwise left-leaning middle class. Since 
launching privatization programs should imply a credible commitment to abstain from 
adopting any other policy which may interfere with the expected private outcomes of 
privatization, Biais and Perotti (2002) conclude that only right-wing parties are able to 
enact credible privatization , being left-wing parties always tempted to ‘hold up’ 
shareholders ex post through a redistribution of rents towards their constituents. 
This conclusion is consistent, on the theoretical side, with common wisdom on 
political party differentiation over economic policy (Alesina, 1988; Alesina and 
Rosenthal, 1995; Perrotti, 1995; Garrett, 1998; Besley, 2007) between left-wing parties 
(traditionally focused on policies increasing government spending and public 
ownership) and right-wing ones (typically oriented towards lower spending, balanced 
budget, lower inflation and a reduced presence of the state in the economy); Biais and 
Perotti’s argument is also consistent, on the empirical side, with the findings outlined 
in several applied investigations.  
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Many scholars have attempted to analyze and measure the political and institutional 
determinants of privatization in network industries, interpreting the degree of public 
ownership as the most significant, if not exhaustive, proxy for the adoption of market-
oriented policies in developed economies (Perotti, 1995; Boix, 1997; Meggison and 
Netter, 2001; Li and Xu, 2002; Biais and Perotti, 2002; Schneider, Fink, and 
Tenbucken, 2005; Dinc and Gupta, 2007; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008; Schneider and 
Nage, 2008; Biørnskov and Potrafke, 2009; Arin and Ulubasoglu, 2009)  
In particular, Li and Xu (2002), in a study of the political economy of privatization in 
the telecommunications sector, find that whether a country privatizes or not depends 
on its political structure. Some authors find a positive relationship between the 
decision to privatize and the government’s strength, in terms of low levels of both 
political competition (Dinc and Gupta, 2007), and political fragmentation as observed 
under a proportional electoral system (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008). These findings 
are somewhat confirmed by several analyses showing empirical evidence of 
privatization’s benefits with increasing dissatisfaction and opposition among citizens 
and policymakers (Kikeri and Nellis, 2004; Wood, 2004). Other scholars have 
investigated how far ideology determines the design and implementation of 
privatization programs (Appel, 2000), outlining how right-wing office-holders with re-
election concerns design privatization to spread share ownership among domestic 
voters (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008). The influence of right-wing governments on the 
privatization race has been confirmed by Biørnskov and Potrafke (2009) for Central 
and Eastern Europe and by Arin and Ulubasoglu (2009) for the cement industry in 
Turkey. Legal traditions also have been indicated as a relevant influence in general on 
several economic policies (La Porta et al., 1999) and in particular on liberalization 
(Pitlik, 2007). The regularity observed by many empirical investigations shows that 
‘politics matter’ for the adoption of privatization policy and that the decision to 
privatize is significantly influenced by majoritarian and right-wing governments, 
while proportional electoral rules and left-wing governments seem traditionally to 
have hindered it.  
 
 
B. POLITICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINANTS OF LIBERALIZATION 
 
While the political economy of privatization choices has been largely investigated, the  
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analysis of institutional and political determinants of liberalization policy is still in its 
infancy. In the light of the evidence on the determinants of privatization, some 
scholars have concluded that additionally other market-oriented policies in network 
industries, such as liberalization, are mainly driven by right-wing parties in office. 
Duso (2002), studying regulatory intervention and entry liberalization within the 
mobile telecommunications industry in OECD countries during the 1990s, shows how 
countries with majoritarian elections liberalize more, with left-wing governments 
liberalizing less than right-wing governments.  
Pitlik (2007) finds, for 22 OECD countries, that a left-wing orientation of government 
and a high degree of legislative fragmentation are negatively related to deregulation of 
markets. Duso and Seldeslachts (2009) investigate liberalization in mobile 
telecommunications in 24 OECD countries, showing how a majoritarian political 
system induces a faster liberalization, with right-wing parties pushing more for 
market-oriented reforms.  
Finally, Potrafke (2010) analyzes the impact of government ideology on the 
liberalization of network industries in 21 OECD countries, showing how market-
oriented and right-wing governments have been more active in deregulating product 
markets, while European Union membership does not turn out to be statistically 
significant.  
The limited empirical literature so far available confirms, for liberalization policy in 
network industries, the same conclusions as those reached in the literature on 
privatization: a strong role for right-wing governments and majoritarian systems. 
Besides, the impact of international policy diffusion and supranational determinants, 
such as European Union membership, in inducing the adoption of market-oriented 
policies seems more controversial, as Pitlik (2007) and Potrafke (2010) respectively 
find the effects to be weak or absent, while Høj, Galasso, Nicoletti, and Dang (2006) 




C.  STYLIZED  FACTS AND PUZZLES ON THE POLITICAL  DETERMINANTS OF 
LIBERALIZATION IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES 
 
Some of the above preliminary conclusions on the relationship between partisanship  
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and liberalization turn out to be puzzling on empirical grounds.  
Indeed, they seem apparently inconsistent with some relevant experiences of 
liberalization processes observed in many developed economies. Several liberalization 
reforms in network industries have been led by left-wing and centrist and/or 
independent governments, proportional electoral rules and heterogeneous and ‘weak’ 
governmental coalitions (Figure 1).  
 
FIGURE 1 
Aggregate liberalization race in seven network industries for 30 OECD countries and right-wing/left-













Note: liberalization is measured by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) indicator of entry barriers from its 
maximum value (the index ranges from 0 to 6): the liberalization initiatives’ intensity (Y axis) is then 
calculated as two-year variations of the liberalization index. On the right side of the graph the average 
intensity before 2000 is displayed, on the left side two-year variations after 2000 are shown. 
 
Figure 1 above reports the aggregate liberalization race in seven network industries 
for 30 OECD countries. On the right side of the graph the average liberalization 
intensity before 2000 is displayed, on the left side two-year variations after 2000 are 
shown. Figure 1 makes it clear first of all that, within a sample of 30 OECD countries, 
before 2000 left-wing governments implemented some liberalization (measured by 
two-year variations in the inverse of ECTR index (OECD, 2009)) in the same vein as 
right-wing governments, which however seem to have undertaken a higher level of 
liberalization from an inferential point of view, as outlined by Pitlik (2007) and 
Potrafke (2010), who study a smaller sample of OECD countries through 2002-03.  
The new evidence clearly shows that, from the late Nineties onward, left-oriented 
governments undoubtedly have been more active than right-oriented ones in 
liberalization policies, while both right-wing and left-wing executives appear to have 
reduced liberalization activity after 2006, having approached in many sectors the floor  
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of entry barrier reductions in the OECD indicator. 
Some stylized facts, picked from the communications and electricity sectors, confirm 
this pattern.  
 
 
Some evidence of Left-Wing Liberalizations in the Communications Sector 
 
With regard to the Danish communications sector, in 1999 the Social Democrats 
approved an agreement enabling the establishment of alternative infrastructures in the 
access network through the public tendering of frequency resources, in order to 
enhance competition in the market. At the end of the same year, the Danish 
parliament, again under the leadership of the Social Democrats, approved Act No. 
1996 (amending the Act on Radio-communications and Assignment of Radio 
Frequencies and the Act on Public Mobile Communications) that substantially 
increased competition in broadband services and in the mobile market. Similarly, in 
Portugal a government led by the Socialist Party fully liberalized the 
telecommunications services between 1998 and 2000; in 2000, in particular, Portugal 
Telecom lost its exclusive rights as a telecoms service provider. More generally, in the 
telecommunications sector, left-wing governments have led substantive liberalization 
processes in several countries. In France, the Socialists approved an unbundling decree 
in 2000 that mandated France Telecom to provide both raw copper unbundling and 
shared access to its loops. In Germany, the left-wing SPD approved in 2003 a new 
Telecommunications Act reducing entry barriers. In Greece, Law No. 2246 of 1994 
(introduced by the Pan-Hellenic Socialists) liberalized all telecommunications services 
and the mobile market. In Hungary, the Hungarian Socialist Party enacted a number 
of regulatory initiatives concerning licensing in telecommunications services between 
1996 and 1998. In Italy, the liberalization of satellite services and the voice telephony 
market started with Law No. 249/97 by the Center-Left Ulivo alliance. In the 
Netherlands, the Labor Party implemented the liberalization of telecommunications 
infrastructure and of all telecommunications services between 1996 and 1997. In 
Poland, several ordinances between 1996 and 2001 were implemented by SRP, and 
then by SLD, concerning various aspects of the telecommunications market. In Spain, 
in 1995 the PSOE approved the Satellite Telecommunications Act and the Cable 
Telecommunications Act that authorized the concession for cable services through a  
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call for tenders. In Turkey, the parliament, led by the Democratic Left Party, approved 
the end of the monopoly of Turk Telekom in 2000. In Canada, a number of 
liberalization initiatives for the telecommunications market were implemented by the 
Liberal Party, starting from 1994. 
 
 
Some evidence of Left-Wing Liberalizations in the Electricity Sector 
 
Also in the electricity sector, left-wing governments have implemented pro-
competitive policies in the past. We recall here some concrete initiatives in brief. In 
Australia, the left-wing government of Victoria passed an Electricity Industry Act in 
1993 which created a wholesale market. In Canada, the Electric Utilities Act was 
approved in Alberta in 2001, and the Energy Competition Act passed in Ontario in 
1998, both through the promotion of the Liberal Party, completely liberalizing 
electricity supply. In the Czech Republic, the Energy Act of 2000 was approved by a 
parliament dominated by the Social Democratic Party – CSSD. In Denmark, the 
Amendment to the Danish Electricity Supply Act issued in 1996 was approved by the 
Social Democrat-led parliament, so permitting private companies and distribution 
companies of sufficient size to buy power from third parties. In France, in 2000, Law 
No. 2000-108 concerning the access of new entrants to both distribution and 
transmission networks was enacted by the National Assembly under the Socialists. In 
Greece, the Electricity Law of 1999, complying with Directive 96/92/EC and 
applying free market rules to electricity generation and supply, was introduced by the 
Pan-Hellenic Socialists. In Italy, in 1999, with the Bersani Decree (Decree 79/99), the 
liberalization of the electricity sector and the establishment of a sectoral Regulatory 
Authority were introduced by the Center-Left coalition. In Japan, the first left-wing 
government since 1975 (led by the Social Democratic Party – SDPJ) approved the 
Amendment to the Electricity Utility Law in 1995, introducing a system of 
competitive tendering in the wholesale electricity market. In the Netherlands, with the 
Electricity Act of 1998 introduced by the Labor Party, decentralized energy 
generation was favored. In Poland, the Energy Act was issued by the SRP in 1997, 
allowing large electricity users to negotiate directly with generators of power. In 
Spain, the Electricity Act was promoted by the Socialist Party – PSOE - in 1994, 
creating the Independent System and setting up competition for the access to  
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electricity networks. In Sweden, the Law for the Supply of Electricity 10/95 in 1995 
was introduced by the Social Democrats, making it possible to generate and trade 
electricity in a competitive environment. In Turkey, the Electricity Market Law of 
2001, establishing a new entity to oversee all energy market activities, was promoted 
by the Democratic Left Party – DSP. Finally, in the USA, the Public Utility 
Regulatory Policies Act – PURPA –, aimed at encouraging decentralized energy 




General evidence of Left-Wing Liberalization Race in Network Industries 
 
Besides the mentioned instances of launching liberalization in the communications and 
electricity sectors, left-wing governments have been active – to differing extents - in 
other industries, such as air transport, gas, post, rail and road.  
 
FIGURE 2 
Liberalization race in seven network industries for 30 OECD countries and right-wing/left-wing 











Note: liberalization is measured by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) indicator of entry barriers from its 
maximum value (the index ranges from 0 to 6); liberalization initiatives’ intensity (Y axis) is then 
calculated as two-year variations of the liberalization index and expressed as an average over the 1975-
2006 period. 
 
As reported in Figure 2, with the exception of the road sector (where right-wing 
governments seem to be far more active than left-wing ones) and of the post and gas 
sector (where parties of either political leaning show a similar intensity in 
liberalization), left-wing governments perform better than right-wing ones as to  
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liberalization intensity. We therefore claim that empirical analyses that refer to a 
limited number of countries and that do not consider the deregulation process in its 
entirety (from the Seventies to date) may lead only to partial conclusions. Indeed, 
especially in the last decade, many left-wing governments seem to have pushed 
convincingly towards liberalization.  
 
Finally, Figure 3 reports all the liberalization patterns (as an average for seven 
network industries) observed in 15 of the 30 OECD countries analyzed in this paper in 
which left-wing governments seemed to have pushed towards liberalization. The   
liberalization race under left-wing governments is labeled by ‘L’, whereas ‘R’ stands 




Performance of Left-Wing Governments on liberalization policy for seven Network Industries 
Source: Elaboration from OECD (2006, 2009) and World Bank (2009); L= left-wing; R= right-wing; NC= non 
classified. 



























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Australia
L L L L L R L L L L
R R
R
























































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Czech Republic
R L L L L L L L R R R R R R



































R R NC NC R R R L L L L
L R R
L L L L



























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
France
NC NC NC NC NC NC R R R R R R L L L L R R




























L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L L R R
R

























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Hungary

































































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Mexico




























































1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Norway



































L L NC NC NC NC NC NC R L L
R R R R R R R
R R
R
























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Portugal
































L NC NC NC L NC NC NC NC R R R R R R
























1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Years
Turkey
R R L L L
L R R R
R






































According to Figure 3, the historical evidence of liberalization policies adopted in 
seven network industries (communications, electricity, air transport, gas, post, rail and 
road) over the last two decades under left-wing governments – as in Australia, Canada, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and even the USA – shows relevant exceptions to 
the empirical findings supporting the view that the right wing favors liberalization and 
the left wing is against it.  
We point out that the stylized facts shown in the above figures are hard to reconcile 
with earlier empirical findings unambiguously attributing a significantly greater 
impact of right-wing governments upon liberalization than of left-wing ones, at least 
with reference to the most updated OECD sample we have reported and employed in 
our analysis (OECD, 2009).    
To contribute to solving the above empirical puzzle, we investigate the following 
hypothesis:  
 
Left-wing governments have been more active than right-wing ones in adopting liberalization 
of network industries.  
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In doing so, we also explore whether homogeneous coalitions and majoritarian 
systems induce a higher level of liberalization of network industries than do 
heterogeneous coalitions and proportional electoral systems. 
 
 
3. Data and empirical strategy 
 
3.1   Data and variables  
 
In order to perform the empirical analysis we collect a well-suited data set in which we 
link information on countries’ liberalization outcomes to various characteristics of 
national governments. We use data from various sources over the 1975-2006 period. 
The base sample we use is the largest possible given the data availability (30 
countries);2 moreover, our sample period covers entirely the liberalization wave 
observed in Western countries in the last three decades through 2006, whereas 
previous analyses focused on a smaller number of countries and on a shorter period 
coverage. 
To construct an index of economic liberalization (which we call Liberalization in our 
empirical analysis) we use the entry barriers index measured by the Indicators of 
Regulation in Energy, Transport and Communications – ETCR – (OECD, 2009) and 
calculate the variable Liberalization by subtracting the OECD (2009) entry barriers 
measure from its maximum value. The OECD (2009) entry barriers index is calculated 
by OECD as the simple average of seven sectoral indicators that, in turn, measure the 
strictness of the legal conditions of entry in the following non-manufacturing sectors: 
passenger air transport, telecommunications, electricity, gas, post, rail and road. Our 
final Liberalization index ranges from 0 to 6.3 
To identify the government party’s political orientation with respect to economic 
policy, we use information from the Database of Political Institutions (World Bank, 
2008), which has been routinely used in cross-country quantitative studies (see, among 
                                                 
2 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United 
States. 
3 For a comprehensive description of the ETCR indicators see Conway and Nicoletti (2006).  
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others, Dutt and Mitra (2005), Krause and Méndez (2005), and Giuliano and Scalise 
(2009)). We construct three dummy variables –  Left,  Right  and  Other – which 
respectively equal 1 if: the government party is defined as socialist, social-democratic, 
communist or left-wing (Left); it is defined as conservative, Christian democratic or 
right-wing (Right); or it is defined as centrist or does not fit into the two previously 
mentioned categories (Other).4 
The relation between the executive’s orientation and economic liberalization outcomes 
may be dependent also on a government's other characteristics, the omission of which 
might cause estimation bias. For example, as suggested by Bortolotti and Pinotti 
(2008), the effective lawmaking power of the government is (possibly) relevant to the 
executive’s capacity to implement economic policies, so that a low legislative power 
may affect the executive’s initiatives regardless of its political orientation. We cope 
with this problem by including a set of legislature-specific variables in the econometric 
analysis. 
 
In particular, we consider the following variables. 
 
GovHeterogeneity: this variable is defined as the probability that two deputies picked at 
random from among the government parties will be of different parties (source: World 
Bank, 2008);  
 
Majority: this measures the margin of majority, that is the fraction of seats held by the 
government, calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats 
(source: World Bank, 2008); 
 
AllHouse: this is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the party of the executive has an 
absolute majority in the houses that have lawmaking powers (source: World Bank, 
2008); 
 
YearsInOffice: this is defined as the number of years the chief executive has been in 
office (source: World Bank, 2008); 
 
YearsLeft: this is the number of years left in the current term (source: World Bank, 
                                                 




Proportional: this is a dummy variable equal to 1 if representatives are elected based on 
the percentage of votes received by their party and/or the electoral system is 
specifically called ‘proportional representation’ (source: World Bank, 2008).  
 
Several authors highlight that a government’s economic policies do not depend only 
on the executive’s political motivation and lawmaking power but are shaped also by 
the country’s economic characteristics. We control for this possibility and consider a 
set of further covariates. 
First, we use government debt as a percentage of GDP (GovDebt) in order to control 
for the central government's financial situation. This variable measures the entire 
stock of direct government fixed-term contractual obligations to others, outstanding 
on a particular date. It includes domestic and foreign liabilities such as currency and 
money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans; it is the gross amount of 
government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives held 
by the government (source: World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2009). 
Second, the country’s general economic situation as measured by the gross domestic 
product may be important as well. Thus we include GDP converted to 2005 
international dollars using purchasing power parity rates (Gdp), and its per capita 
value (GdpPerCap). Both these variables are obtained from World Bank (2009). 
Third, labor market conditions are another factor potentially relevant to economic 
liberalization. For instance, Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) point out that product and 
labor market regulation are likely to be linked. Accordingly, we consider an indicator 
of the degree of employment protection (EmplProtection), obtained from OECD (2008), 
the employment in industry as a percentage of total employment (Employment), 
obtained from World Bank (2009). EmplProtection is calculated as an unweighted 
average of 12 sub-indicators for regular contracts and six sub-indicators for temporary 
contracts; this variable is a synthetic index of the strictness of the country’s 
employment protection legislation. 
Fourth, we include a dummy variable that records whether a given country has a civil 
law legal system – CivilLaw – (source: La Porta et al., 1998), whose potential relevance 
has been suggested by La Porta et al. (2008). In the same vein, Pitlik (2007) finds 
evidence that ‘legal families’ play a role in affecting market-oriented policies.  
  17
Finally, we also include two dummy variables that record, respectively, the country’s 
membership of the European Union (EUMember) and adoption of the euro (Euro) to 
test whether policy diffusion plays a role in affecting parties in office, irrespective of 
their political ideology, as a supranational driver of national governments’ initiatives 
(Levi-Faur, 2003; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Comin and Diaz Fuentes, 2006; Høj, 
Galasso, Nicoletti and Dang, 2006; Pitlik, 2007). 
 
TABLE 1. Descriptive statistics (left-wing and right-wing governments). 
              
   Right   Left     
Variable   Obs.  Mean    Obs. Mean     Source 
                 
Liberalization
   
359 1.889    336  2.042 
  Authors’ elaboration on OECD 
(2009) data World Bank (2008) 
Majority
    294 0.614    301  0.668    World Bank (2008) 
AllHouse    358 0.276    331  0.280    World Bank (2008) 
YearsInOffice    359 3.988    335  3.814    World Bank (2008) 
YearsLeft    359 1.682    334  1.652    World Bank (2008) 
GovHeterogeneity    354 0.288    326  0.194    World Bank (2008) 
GovDebt    101 56.638    113  59.564    World Bank (2008) 
EmplProtection    246 2.166    236  2.233    OECD (2008) 
Employment    287 28.608    247  28.308    World Bank (2009) 
Gdp    320 1.22e+12    284  8.78e+11    World Bank (2009) 
GdpPerCap    320 23281.64    284  23242.69    World Bank (2009) 
EUMember    359 0.200    336  0.300    Authors’ coding 
Euro    359 0.075    336  0.026    Authors’ coding 
Proportional    358 0.793    332  0.789    World Bank (2008) 
CivilLaw    359 0.239    336  0.214    La Porta et al. (1998) 
               
Note: we have dropped from the sample the Czech Republic’s and Hungary’s observations referring 
to the years of communist dictatorship, while Slovakia’s observations refer to the period after it was 
declared a sovereign state; Switzerland is removed from the final sample because of missing data on 
the main political characteristics of the government. 
 
Generally, policy initiatives take time to generate an observable economic (or legal) 
outcome (Potrafke, 2010). For this reason, we regress our liberalization variable on 
one-year-lagged covariates. So, on the one hand, we avoid attributing an economic 
outcome, resulting perhaps from a laborious political process, to an executive just 
elected; on the other hand, we do not incur endogeneity or reverse causality problems 
due to the simultaneous determination of liberalization and certain types of labor 
market institutions (as measured by EmplProtection) and/or the general economic 
conditions of countries (measured, for instance, by Gdp). 
In our final dataset, the countries with the highest liberalization score at the end of the 
period considered are Denmark (5.7), Germany (5.6) and Sweden (5.5), while those  
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with the lowest are Mexico (2.4), South Korea (3.1) and Turkey (3.6). The countries 
that saw left-oriented governments most often between 1975 and 2006 are Austria, 
Canada, Mexico and Sweden; conversely, Belgium, Japan and South Korea show the 
highest number of right-oriented governments in the period under consideration. On 
average, the government heterogeneity index is about 0.25 and the margin of majority 
of governments is about 0.64 (both these indexes range from 0 to 1).  
A synthetic description of all the variables is provided in Table 1. 
 
 
3.2    Empirical strategy 
 
Even if we include in our analysis all the variables which we deem potentially relevant 
to economic liberalization, it may be argued that unobservable or unmeasurable 
factors, such as national culture or traditions, also affect the economic policies of 
governments (La Porta et al., 1999; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2006). Furthermore, 
time tendencies may shape countries’ liberalization patterns regardless of the political 
beliefs of individual governments (e.g., the ‘globalization wave’).  
To cater for this, we undertake a panel analysis in which we include country- and 
time-fixed effects. Time-fixed effects, in particular, capture the time pattern that is 
constant across countries. Having done so, what we finally obtain is an estimate of the 
marginal effect of country-specific and legislature-specific variables on the variations 
of liberalization outcomes across countries and years, also controlling for time 
tendencies.  
 
Formally, we focus on the following population regression function:  
 
() s c s c tion Liberaliza t + + + = t t βx x E 0 , , β                                                                       (1) 
 
where βx = β1xt1 +…+ βKxtK, and xtj indicates variable j at time t, and where the omitted 
variable country-specific c is time-constant, while the omitted variable time-specific s is 
constant across countries. In model (1) it is assumed that c has the same effect on the 
mean response in each time period and that s has the same effect on the mean response 
in each country.   
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In our context, the basic unobserved effects model (UEM) can be written as: 
 
Liberalization it= βxit+ci+st+uit ,          t = 1975, 1976, …, 2006                               (2) 
 
where xit is a 1 × K vector, ci and st are unobserved components which account for the 
unobserved heterogeneity, and uit are idiosyncratic disturbances that change across t 
and across i. 
In a fixed-effects estimation, ci and st are allowed to be correlated with xit, so that the 
assumption of zero correlation between the observed explanatory variables and the 
unobserved effects is not imposed. By doing so, we obtain results that are more robust 
than those obtained through a random effects analysis. However, as Wooldridge 
(2002) points out, this robustness comes at a price; specifically, we cannot include 
factors constant across countries and periods in xit. In our estimation, we respect this 
restriction.5 
Finally, we calculate one-period-lagged values of the explanatory variables and 
include them in the operative model. Hence, making the response variable and the 
government’s political orientation explicit, we can write model (2) in the following lag 
UEM form:  
 
it t i it it it u s c Right-wing β Left-wing β tion Liberaliza + + + + + + + = − − -1 it -1 it λω   δκ   1 2 1 1 0 β        (3)
 
 
with t = 1975, 1976, …, 2006, and where κit-1 is a vector that contains the legislature-
specific variables, ωit-1 is a vector of controls referring to the country’s economic 
characteristics, δ and λ are vectors of parameters, β0 is the model constant, ci and st are 
unobserved components which account respectively for the unobserved country-
specific (constant over time) and time-specific (constant across countries) 
heterogeneity, and uit are idiosyncratic disturbances that change across t and i.  
Notice that Otherit-1 is the benchmark class for the government’s political orientation 
dummies. 
 
As a robustness check, we perform two model specifications in which we consider also 
                                                 
5 Note that in one model specification, we include a country’s legal family variable (CivilLaw) that is 
time constant. In order to perform this individual regression, we use a random effects model.  
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the one-year lagged deregulation level (observed in each country) and a linear time 
trend explicitly included as one of the covariates.  
When we include the one-year-lagged deregulation level, model (3) becomes: 
 
+ + + + = − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 0 it it it it on Deregulati β Right-wing β Left-wing β tion Liberaliza β  
it t i u s c + + + + + -1 it -1 it λω   δκ                                                                     (3′) 
 
The deregulation level is measured using an indicator obtained by subtracting the 
OECD (2009) ETCR index to its maximum value. The OECD (2009) ETCR index is 
calculated by OECD as the simple average of seven sectoral indicators that, in turn, 
measure the strictness of the legal conditions of entry, the level of public ownership, 
the characteristics of vertical integration and the market structure in the above 
mentioned non-manufacturing sectors. Including the one-year-lagged deregulation 
level allows us to estimate the autoregressive component of liberalization policies. By 
doing so, we can observe the effect of governments’ political orientation independently 
of the existing regulatory conditions which executives find when elected. 
When we include the time trend, model (3) can be written as: 
 
+ + + + = − − it it it it Trend β Right-wing β Left-wing β tion Liberaliza 3 1 2 1 1 0 β  
it t i u s c + + + + + -1 it -1 it λω   δκ                                                                    (3′′) 
 
Including a time trend allows us to estimate the effect, if any, of time factors 
(independent of country-specific variables) influencing the average pattern of 
deregulation in OECD countries. As will be shown in the next section, estimation 





The estimation results are presented in Table 2. We have considered 15 panel model 
specifications, which are constructed in such a way that multicollinearity problems are 
avoided. Notice that the model specifications from (1) to (15) show an increasing  
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explicative power, as we progressively add control variables. In the last specification – 
(15) – the R-square indicates that the proportion of variability in liberalization 
outcomes that is accounted for by the statistical model is almost 80%.  
In all the model specifications in which the governments’ political orientation dummies 
are included, we find that left-oriented governments have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on the observed level of economic liberalization. Conversely, right-
oriented governments do not show statistically significant effects in most of the model 
specifications, while they show a positive and statistically significant effect in models 
(11), (13), (14) and (15). Notice, moreover, that the estimated effect of right-wing 
governments on liberalization always shows a lower intensity and a lower statistical 
significance than those of left-wing governments.  
It is worth emphasizing that we estimate the effect of left-wing and right-wing 
political ideology with respect to centrist or non-classifiable governments (as they are 
defined in the Appendix); thus, what we are able to infer is the effect of a given political 
orientation relative to another and not the absolute effect. It follows that our result 
must be interpreted as a sign of an influence of left-oriented governments on 
liberalization which is greater than that of right-oriented governments, while our 
estimation result does not indicate that right-wing executives do not liberalize in 
absolute terms. 
With respect to the institutional determinants of liberalization in network industries, 
we obtain several interesting results. First, we find that the government’s 
heterogeneity (GovHeterogeneity), which is a proxy of the political fragmentation of the 
government, has a positive influence on liberalization. Second, model specifications (3), 
(7), (8), (10) and (11) show that the margin of majority of the government’s parties 
(Majority) has a negative effect on the level of economic liberalization, which is 
consistent with the previous result. Third, in model specifications (7) and (8) we also 
find a positive effect of proportional representation systems (Proportional). The 
variables AllHouse, YearsInOffice and YearsLeft, on the other hand, do not turn out to 
be statistically significant. 
When we move to consider pre-existing country economic conditions, we obtain 
further interesting results. Model specifications (12), (13), (14) and (15), indeed, show 
that the strictness of the employment protection legislation (EmplProtection) is a 
negative and statistically significant influence on economic liberalization, and so too is 
the relative amount of employment in industry (Employment), as shown in model (15).   
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Supranational drivers of liberalization initiatives may be important as well. In 
particular, model specifications (13), (14) and (15) show that EU membership 
(EUMember) plays a positive and statistically significant role in the reduction of entry 
barriers. A positive and statistically significant effect is also found for the introduction 
of the euro (as has already been suggested by Høj, Galasso, Nicoletti, and Dang 
(2006)), as is shown by model specification (12). Estimated coefficients suggest, in 
particular, that the effect of EU membership is greater than that of adoption of the 
euro. 
Finally, models (12) and (15) reveal that the country’s GDP (Gdp) has a negative 
effect, while models (12), (13) and (15) show that the GDP per capita (GdpPerCap) has 
a positive one. According to model specification (11), the legal family (CivilLaw) seems 
to be statistically irrelevant. 
 
As a robustness check, in model specifications (14) and (15), we have added to country- 
and time-fixed effects respectively the one-year-lagged value of deregulation and a 
linear time trend, in order to estimate the (possibly) relevant effect of time patterns 
that are virtually constant across countries. While the estimated parameters relating 
to both these additional factors turn out to be positive and statistically significant, our 
main results do not change and are shown to be robust across the different 
specifications. Specifically, the positive effect exerted by the one-year-lagged value of 
deregulation indicates that liberalization policies follow a path in which past initiatives 
stimulate subsequent interventions, in a progressive process characterized by a ratchet 
effect. This confirms a strong path-dependency effect of liberalization policy in 
network industries. 
The diagnostic analysis, furthermore, allows us to reject the null hypothesis of joint 
statistical insignificance of all the parameters, in all the considered model 
specifications. Consistently, our findings show that partisanship and political 
institutions have a significant, predictable impact on the intensity of liberalization 
policy in network industries, with left-wing parties choosing higher levels of 
liberalization compared to right-wing parties.6 
                                                 
6 Notice that unreported GLM estimations, in which we add alternatively time and country dummies, 




TABLE 2. Cross-country panel estimation results. Dependent variable: Liberalization. 
  
(1) 














Variable    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                                   
Left     0.430  (0.197) **     0.473  (0.204) **     0.545  (0.225) **     0.432  (0.200) **     0.415  (0.198) **           
Right     0.240  (0.193)      0.161  (0.198)     0.342  (0.221)      0.242  (0.197)     0.212  (0.195)           
GovHeterogeneity          0.903  (0.354) **                    0.689  (0.344) **      
Majority              -2.419 (0.381)  ***                   -2.513 (0.383)  *** 
AllHouse                   -0.292 (0.187)                  
YearsInOffice                         0.025  (0.020)           
Proportional                                   2.913  (0.539) *** 
YearsLeft                                    
GovDebt                                    
Employment                                    
EmplProtection                                    
Gdp                                    
GdpPerCap                                    
Euro                                    
EUMember                                    
CivilLaw                                    
Deregulation                                    
Trend                                    
Constant     1.648  (0.163) ***     1.466  (0.195) ***     3.240  (0.305) ***     1.729  (0.169) ***     1.565  (0.176) ***     1.785  (0.103) ***     1.352  (0.503) *** 
                                    
 
Time and country FE    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes   Yes    Yes 
Time and country RE    No  No  No  No  No   No    No 
Number of obs.    805  782  681  795  802   782    666 
F-Statistics    7.02  6.68  7.54  6.22  6.77   7.05    8.76 
H0: bi=bj=0 (p-v.)    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000    0.000 
R-sq.    0.014  0.016  0.078  0.027  0.021   0.002    0.001 
                  
Note: * = 0.10 confidence level, ** = 0.05 confidence level, *** = 0.01 confidence level.  
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TABLE 2. (Continued) 
  
(8) 
PANEL   
(9) 
PANEL 
  (10) 
PANEL 
  (11) 
PANEL 
  (12) 
PANEL 







Variable    Coef. (Std.Err.)    Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.)   Coef. (Std.Err.) 
                                        
Left     0.488  (0.233) **     0.464  (0.206) **     0.515  (0.234) **     0.574  (0.224) ***     0.432  (0.161) ***     0.586  (0.273) *     0.446  (0.215) **     0.224  (0.096) ** 
Right     0.251  (0.230)      0.167  (0.202)     0.313  (0.230)      0.368  (0.221) *     0.226  (0.159)      0.526  (0.277) *     0.408  (0.218) *      0.180  (0.095) *  
GovHeterogeneity          0.845  (0.368) **                               -0.100 (0.141) 
Majority    -2.597 (0.384)  ***           -2.349 (0.391)  ***    -2.311 (0.379)  ***                          
AllHouse         -0.160 (0.199)    -0.214 (0.196)    -0.239 (0.185)                       0.042  (0.073)  
YearsInOffice          0.020  (0.021)     0.038  (0.024)     0.042  (0.023) *                    -0.008 (0.008)   
Proportional     2.888  (0.537) ***                                         
YearsLeft         -0.010 (0.043)     0.013  (0.046)     0.010  (0.045)                    -0.019 (0.016)   
GovDebt                                0.007  (0.006)      0.007  (0.004)         
Employment                                   0.058  (0.035)     -0.057  (0.014) ***  
EmplProtection                        -1.259 (0.119)  ***    -1.056 (0.186)  ***    -0.757 (0.148)  ***   -0.326 (0.078)  *** 
Gdp                        -0.001 (0.000)  **     0.001  (0.001)    -0.001 (0.000)  **    -0.001 (0.001)   
GdpPerCap                         0.001  (0.000) ***     0.001  (0.000) ***    -0.000 (0.000)     0.001  (0.000) *** 
Euro                         0.422  (0.149) ***                
EUMember                                1.584  (0.237) ***     1.165  (0.183) ***     0.347  (0.074) *** 
CivilLaw                   -0.064 (0.428)                         
Deregulation                                        0.967  (0.041) *** 
Trend                                   0.259  (0.026) ***       
Constant     1.109  (0.535) ***     1.461  (0.239) ***     3.118  (0.348) ***     3.190  (0.385) ***    -1.278 (0.444)  ***    -4.562 (1.005)  ***    -3.852  (1.275) ***      1.834  (0.514) ***  
                                         
 
Time and country FE    Yes  Yes  Yes  No   Yes    Yes    Yes    Yes 
Time and country RE    No  No  No  Yes    No    No    No    No 
Number of obs.    782  681  795  672   538    204    193    465 
F-Statistics    8.42  6.14  6.57   --    31.87    18.93    12.54    19.73 
H0: bi=bj=0 (p-v.)    0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
R-sq.    0.001  0.023  0.088  0.091  0.416   0.415    0.241    0.793 
                     
Note: * = 0.10 confidence level, ** = 0.05 confidence level, *** = 0.01 confidence level. 
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Our main findings contrast with some statistical results in extant empirical literature 
(e.g., Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010). While we find that left-wing governments have a 
positive impact on liberalization in network industries and that the effect of right-wing 
governments is lower in terms of both estimated intensity and statistical significance, 
previous investigations, considering a shorter period and a smaller sample, show the 
opposite. We believe that such a difference is mainly due to two elements. 
On the one hand, we use different variables in order to account for the effect of 
governments’ political ideology.  For instance, the two indices used by Potrafke (2010) 
are compact variables which oppose left with right and which weight the ideology 
scores with the government party’s relative share of seats in parliament; similarly, 
Pitlik (2007) measures political orientation of governments by means of a five-year 
averaged index of left-wing party cabinet positions over total cabinet seats.  
The World Bank (2008) index that we use, in contrast, is composed of a set of three 
dummies that allow us to study separately the effect of right-wing and left-wing 
governments with respect to that of non-classifiable governments, which are 
considered as the reference group. Moreover, we do not weight the index for the 
relative lawmaking power of the executive’s leading party, while we include various 
measures of lawmaking power of governments as separate covariates.  
On the other hand, we consider a longer period than that examined by previous 
literature along with a larger set of factors. Our estimation results partially converge 
with those of Pitlik (2007) and Potrafke (2010) when we restrict our analysis to the 
1975-1999 period, as unreported estimations show. 
On the one hand, we use different variables in order to account for the effect of 
governments’ political ideology.  For instance, the two indices used by Potrafke (2010) 
are compact variables which oppose left with right and which weight the ideology 
scores with the government party’s relative share of seats in parliament; similarly, 
Pitlik (2007) measures political orientation of governments by means of a five-year 
averaged index of left-wing party cabinet positions over total cabinet seats.  
The World Bank (2008) index that we use, in contrast, is composed of a set of three 
dummies that allow us to study separately the effect of right-wing and left-wing 
governments with respect to that of non-classifiable governments, which are 
considered as the reference group. Moreover, we do not weight the index for the 
relative lawmaking power of the executive’s leading party, while we include various 
measures of lawmaking power of governments as separate covariates.   
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On the other hand, we consider a longer period than that examined by previous 
literature along with a larger set of factors. Our estimation results partially converge 
with those of Pitlik (2007) and Potrafke (2010) when we restrict our analysis to the 
1975-1999 period, as unreported estimations show.  
 
5. Discussion  
 
Our analysis confirms that politics matter for liberalization of network industries (Duso, 
2002; Høj, Galasso, Nicoletti, and Dang, 2006; Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010). The 
conclusion we reach - that right-wing governments on average liberalize less than left-
wing ones - while reversing related literature, is rather general, being found in all the 
specifications analyzed and taking into account the existing regulatory conditions that 
executives are faced with when elected. This means that our results are fairly robust 
and are not affected by initial local conditions, in one sense or another. 
Figure 4 outlines the estimated liberalization trends of left-wing governments for each 
of the model specifications reported in Table 2, in which political orientation dummies 
are included. Trends are calculated considering the estimated effect of having a left-
wing government rather than another one, starting from an initial situation of null 
liberalization, and considering this effect, for each time interval, with respect to the 
previous level of liberalization. As we can see, all the model specifications confirm a 
significant growing trend in left-wing liberalizations. The one referring to the last 
specification (15), which includes the largest set of control variables, shows a similar 
but flatter trend. Figure 4 also outlines the strong path-dependency effect we actually 
found for every political color in office. The level of past deregulation turns out to be 
particularly relevant, suggesting that liberalization processes follow a progressive path 
with a ratchet effect, both for the aggregate indicators and for sectoral ones. 
 Moreover, as the estimated positive effect of the autoregressive component suggests, 
rather than observing strong discontinuity and shocks, we registered a gradual 
implementation of liberalization policies. This implies that once a liberalization process 
is launched, its intensity may depend on the political color of the party in office, but it 
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Model (15)
Models (1), (2), (3), 
(4), (5), (8), (9), (10), 








1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
 
 
Surprisingly, we did not find a statistically significant effect of legal origins on 
network industry liberalization, contrary to what might be expected according to the 
general insights of La Porta et al. (1999) and Pitlik’s (2007) findings for liberalization 
policies. We cannot however exclude that this could be due to the strong role played 
by the country-specific variables that we considered in our analysis, which are partially 
correlated with the legal origin of nations. Some legal scholars, in addition, have 
recently cast doubts on the assumption that legal origins are the foundation of legal 
institutions and economic outcomes (see, for example, Roe, 2006).  
As to political determinants, our findings contrast with the empirical literature 
available so far (Pitlik, 2007; Potrafke, 2010), probably due, as we argued, to the 
broader dimensions of the sample we study - both in terms of OECD countries 
included and number of years covered – and to the different indicator we adopted for 
governments’ political color, with respect to previous analyses.  
The ‘political economy of economic policies’ so far has simply neglected the left-wing 
issue, falling into line with conventional wisdom, confirmed by the empirical literature, 
on significantly greater right-wing adoption of other market-oriented policies, such as 
privatization. However, the liberalization paths we observed in network industries 
force us to give a reason for the political-economic rationale behind them. Here, we do 
not attempt to solve this puzzle; rather we simply raise insights and questions - 
applying only to network industries - for further research on the issue.  
Based on insights coming from the literature on political determinants of economic 
policy, we briefly outline five main motivations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, for  
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a left-wing liberalization rationale in network industries:  
a) liberalization as the result of crossing ideological divides and/or policy diffusion;  
b) liberalization as a ‘policy reversal’;  
c) liberalization as a signal towards swing voters under political competition;  
d) liberalization as a weak, institutionally determined, market-oriented policy; 
e) liberalization as a ‘new’ left-wing policy. 
 
In discussing left-wing motivations for liberalization in network industries we also 
analyze whether such motivations are consistent with the evidence we found, with 
particular reference to the apparent decline in right-wing liberalization intensity. 
 
 
A. THE BREACHING OF IDEOLOGICAL CLEAVAGES AND THE ROLE OF POLICY DIFFUSION  
 
A first possible motivation for a left-wing liberalization rationale in network industries 
is summarized in the following question: are left-wing policy-makers breaching 
ideological cleavages, by shifting their political platform ‘to the right’?  
This argument derives from the idea that economic liberalization may have created ‘a 
new issue cleavage that has disturbed existing party systems. In some cases, it has 
narrowed and blurred partisan policy differences; in others, it has caused these 
differences to widen and become more distinguishable to the median voter.  In yet 
others, it may have left the scope of partisan differences unchanged, but nonetheless 
prompted a partisan realignment. The alteration of the terms of political competition, 
in turn, has provoked changes in the nature of political representation’ (Hagopian, 
2001).  
In a sense, this view entails the relationship between social class and voting behavior, 
and claims that a progressive decline is observed during the last decades over ‘class 
voting’ (Clark and Lipset 2001; Nieuwbeerta and De Graaf 1999), as social class 
schemes may undergo abrupt changes in post-industrial society (Butler and Savage 
1995; Esping-Andersen 1993, 1999; Hout et al. 1995; Kriesi 1989; Manza and Brooks 
1999). In this respect, the race towards liberalization policy (Pitlik, 2007), which has 
characterized OECD countries in the last three decades (Conway and Nicoletti, 2006), 
may be the result of changes in the social structure and hence in political competition. 
As a consequence, liberalization became a post-ideological ‘must have’ item in political  
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parties’ policy toolkits, irrespective of traditional cleavages. According to this view, 
liberalization policies should be deemed as neither rightist nor leftist, but simply as a 
common mandatory feature of modern globalized economies (Ross, 2000).  
As to globalization processes, since parties in office ‘have to satisfy two constituencies, 
one internal and the other external, with the very existence of the latter inhibiting the 
development of the former’ (Innes, 2002), policy diffusion and international ‘clustering’ 
may have induced or even reinforced the above effect, ‘forcing’ bipartisan 
liberalization.  
The argument that supranational determinants might accelerate liberalization, 
regardless of governments’ political color, is confirmed in our analysis of the role 
played in network industries’ liberalization by European Union membership and by a 
country’s adoption of the euro (Høj, Galasso, Nicoletti, and Dang, 2006). This 
evidence, in our view, confirms the relevance of policy diffusion theories, as well as the 
empirical relationship observed between globalization and liberalization (Levi-Faur, 
2003; Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Clifton, Comin and Diaz Fuentes, 2006; Pitlik, 2007). 
However, it must be said that these two interdependent interpretations (the breaching 
of ideological cleavages and the role of policy diffusion) only partially fit with our 
findings. Indeed, as the result of bilateral political competition for the middle-class 
voter on the one side – which typically induces political parties not to compete on 
policies (Downs, 1957; Roemer, 2001) - and of international policy diffusion on the 
other, we should have found accordingly not only bipartisan liberalization, but also a 
similar intensity of liberalization adoption, for both left-wing and right-wing parties.  
On the contrary, what we find is a significant right-wing/left-wing divide and 
asymmetric patterns, with an increasing intensity over time of left-wing liberalizations 
coupled with a decline in right-wing ones. This result reveals that something would be 
missed if we rely exclusively on the policy diffusion hypothesis as an explanation for 
the observed left-wing liberalization wave. 
  
 
B. LIBERALIZATION AS A POLICY REVERSAL 
 
A second rationale for left-wing policy-makers’ implementation of a market-oriented 
swing in the shape of liberalization, has been identified, among others, by Rodrik 
(1993) and Cukierman and Tommasi (1998). It goes under the label of ‘policy reversal’.   
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These authors argue that a policy switch between right-wing and left-wing parties, with 
respect to their traditional policy platforms, turns out to be optimal under given 
circumstances.  
The intuition behind this is that governments have private information on the current 
state of the economy in general and on a political issue in particular. Given that, policy 
makers take their decisions in order to maximize the interest of the majority of voters. 
Thus, in order to gain consensus from the largest part of the electorate, governments 
have to transmit to the public their private information about the relative desirability 
of a given policy. However, the success of policy announcements will depend on the 
political party’s credibility when transmitting information and motivation to the 
public. A political party will turn out to be more credible the greater is the distance of 
the policy announced from its political ‘ideal point’. As a consequence, moderate right-
wing policies are more likely to be implemented by right-wing parties (and similarly 
for the left), but extreme right-wing policies are more likely to be implemented by left-
wing parties (and vice versa).  
The reason for this is that, though a policy reversal, ‘the public has less reason to 
suspect that the right-wing policy is proposed solely because of the natural ideological 
tendencies of the party in office, i.e., it may be perceived as an objectively motivated 
policy’. In this situation, ‘extreme’ policy options when announced by the political 
party which is traditionally less close to them, likely reduce political discontent. 
However, one of the main conditions for this outcome is that the policy switch that is 
desirable (for the majority of voters) ‘should be considerable and relatively rare’. 
We should then ask whether left-wing liberalization of network industries falls into 
the category of ‘policy reversals’. The answer is negative on two grounds.  
On the one side, it is true that liberalization is generally perceived to be closer to 
right-wing ‘ideal points’ rather than to left-wing ones. However, it is neither ‘extreme’ 
nor ‘considerable’ as other market-oriented policies, such as privatization, would be. In 
our view, liberalization rather envisaged a right-wing ‘moderate’ policy, and thus, 
according to Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) it should be routinely implemented by 
right-wing governments, which contrasts with our findings attributing a higher 
intensity for liberalization of network industries to left-wing parties in office.  
On the other side, should liberalization deemed as an ‘extreme’ right wing economic 
policy, the theory of policy reversals may explain the asymmetric patterns observed 
respectively for left-wing and right-wing governments. However, this would  
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somewhat contrasts with the vast and convergent empirical findings, reported in 
section 2 above, showing how privatization (which in our view is more extreme than 
liberalization as to ideological cleavages) is generally adopted by right-wing 
governments. 
However, to be a typical case of ‘policy reversal’, under the conditions outlined by 
Cukierman and Tommasi (1998), left-wing liberalization should be a ‘relatively rare’, 
one-shot policy, and thus we should expect dramatic shocks, concentrated in time, for 
left-wing liberalization, rather than the observed gradualism and continuity over time. 
All in all, the theory of policy reversals may hardly provide an unambiguous rationale 
for the observed path in left-wing and roght-wing liberalizations.  
 
 
C.  LIBERALIZATION AS A SIGNAL TOWARDS SWING VOTERS UNDER POLITICAL 
COMPETITION 
 
Another possible interpretation for our results may rely on the argument that the 
asymmetric liberalization patterns observed between left-wing and right-wing parties 
reveal a signaling strategy adopted by left-wing parties to attract otherwise right-
leaning middle class voters (Downs, 1957). Thus, this motivation for a left-wing 
liberalization rationale does not rely on convergent bipartisan liberalization, but rather 
on a specific left-wing strategy to win political competition. The argument might go as 
follows: by restructuring the economy and minimizing rent-seeking - through market 
discipline in liberalized sectors dominated by state-owned incumbents - left-wing 
parties may attempt to attract median voters otherwise tempted to vote for right-wing 
parties. This interpretation thus mirrors somehow the one provided by Biais and 
Perotti (2002) for the Right’s privatization rationale, based on a strategic signaling to 
win support from (left-wing) median voters (see section 2 above). Moreover, this 
explanation is in line with the idea that political competition may induce political 
parties in office to adopt those market oriented policies which increase economic 
growth (Besley, 2007; Besley, Persson, Sturn, 2010). 
However, it may only hold under specific conditions of political and electoral 
competition. In seeking to gain middle-class voters’ support through liberalization, 
left-wing parties may risk losing some of their own constituents, who may decide to 
abstain from voting or may even choose to vote for another left-wing competitor,  
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should it be available. When the latter effect dominates, ‘self-interested’ left-wing 
parties will be induced not to compete for middle-class voters. Consequently, in a 
political arena where middle-class voters make the difference, a left-wing party may 
have interest in maintaining at least the portion of its own voters which is sufficient to 
win the elections (Belloc and Nicita, 2010b).  
Our empirical results highlight the need for some caution on this conclusion, 
liberalization being negatively correlated with employment protection legislation and 
with the amount of employment in industry. Thus, on the economic side, strict 
legislation on employment protection may reduce, as a barrier to entry, new entrants’ 
incentives to challenge incumbents’ market power in network industries, thus 
weakening the credibility and even the expected impact of liberalization; while, on the 
political side, left-wing liberalizations may generate short-term adjustments and 
unemployment in a country’s work-force, as a consequence of the restructuring of 
former legal monopolies, with offsetting effects on some left-wing constituents.  
Left-wing parties’ ability to credibly liberalize in order to gain the political support of 
otherwise right-leaning middle-class voters, may thus strictly depend on their ability 
to extend their traditional platform ‘to the right’, while constrained by their 
constituents’ preferences.  
In this respect, some authors argued that one way to measure the ‘distance’ between 
partisan constituents and middle-class voters is the level of income inequality (Biais 
and Perotti, 2002). The intuition is that unequal societies tend to be politically 
polarized, ‘squeezing’ the size, and thus the marginal value for political competition, of  
middle-class voters. Should this assumption turn out to be correct, we would expect, 
other things being equal, more left-wing liberalization in countries with less income 
inequality. In a companion paper we test this assumption and find a statistically 
significant negative correlation between the level of income inequality and 
liberalization rates by left-wing government (Belloc and Nicita, 2010b). Feedback 
effects in both directions (inequality-liberalization) cannot be ruled out, even if income 
equality ‘explains’ left-wing liberalization, while the opposite causal relation turned 
out to be non-significant. 
Besides, since the nature of the ideological cleavage constraints by standard 
constituents depends, for left-wing parties, on whether or not there is credible 
competition on their left side of the political market (Stigler, 1972; Roemer, 2001), one 
should expect a less ‘moderate’ policy by left-wing parties in countries with multi- 
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party competition and low barriers to entry into the political competition arena 
(Palfrey,1984; Plümper and Martin, 2008), unless left-wing parties may form a 
winning coalition with ‘centrist’ parties (see below, D). As a consequence, when the 
probability of winning an election with a homogeneous coalition dominates, we should 
expect majoritarian systems to favor (left-wing) liberalization more than proportional 
electoral systems would (Osborne, 1995; Besley, 2007).  
In this respect, our findings raise another puzzle, showing a positive and statistically 
significant influence of proportional electoral rules on liberalization. Thus, in order to 
test the validity of the interpretation of left-wing liberalization as a signal towards 
swing voters, one should investigate in detail the degree of electoral competition and 
the specificity of the countries’ electoral systems.  
It should be pointed out that we are focusing here on just one issue of parties’ political 
platforms, while political competition is typically multi-dimensional (Roemer, 2001).  
A left-wing party may well use liberalization of network industries as a market-
oriented compensating policy, within a political platform which massively redistributes 
toward traditional constituents through other policy tools. This would be consistent 
with our evidence that the heterogeneity of governmental coalitions exerts a positive 
influence on the liberalization rate (see below D).  
To conclude, the significant left-wing liberalization wave registered from the Nineties 
onward could be explained as an attempt to find a strategic ‘third way’ positioning 
(Giddens, 1998), after the fall of communism. Italy, in this respect, is an important 
benchmark: the Nineties were largely characterized by left-wing governments, with 
the participation of former communist parties, who significantly launched 
liberalization and privatization programs and appointed Antitrust and Regulatory 
Authorities. However, our analysis and data set can neither support nor exclude this 
interpretation which, in order to be verified on specific grounds, needs to measure the 
evolution and distribution of voters’ preferences in each country. 
Finally, while the intuition that left-wing liberalization may act as a signal towards 
middle-class voters could explain – with the caveats outlined above – why left-wing 
governments liberalize, it does not provide any argument supporting our evidence that 





D.  LIBERALIZATION AS A WEAK,  INSTITUTIONALLY  DETERMINED,  MARKET-
ORIENTED POLICY 
 
The three motivations provided above all imply that left-wing parties take their policy 
decisions ‘against’ their own traditional ideological adherences. Thus the underlying 
assumption is that liberalization is a kind of pro-market policy mirroring a right-wing 
adherences . 
A fourth different rationale for left-wing liberalization could be made with reference to 
the institutional political environment within which political parties decide their 
policies. This argument relies on the idea that when a heterogenous coalition is in 
office and/or when governments are elected under proportional electoral systems, the 
joint exercise of veto powers might select ‘second-best’ policies. Thus, the observed 
path on liberalization policies might be explained as the result of respectively, right 
wing and left-wing concessions, to other parties in the coalition. 
 
FIGURE 5. 
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In particular, when left-wing parties are in office liberalization might be adopted either 
as a way to deter stronger market-oriented policy such as the decision to  privatize 
(Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008), or as a way of conceding ‘some’ market-oriented policy 
●Poland ●Netherlands 
●Germany   
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to other coalition members with different political leanings, in exchange for 
redistributive policies towards left-wing constituents.  
Similarly, when right-wing parties are in office, liberalization might be adopted as a 
second-best when other parties in the coalition contest decisions to adopt stronger big 
bang market oriented policies such as privatization. 
Thus in some weak political-institutional settings, liberalization could be adopted as 
the weakest acceptable market-oriented policy by right-wing parties and as the 
strongest one by left-wing parties. 
O u r  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  r o l e  o f  g o v e r n m e n t  heterogeneity in promoting liberalization, 
confirms a positive and statistically significant effect on entry liberalization in the 
seven markets considered for the 30 countries analyzed. This result was further 
corroborated by the fact that the margin of majority of the government parties shows 
a negative effect on the level of economic liberalization, and it is also consistent with 
the positive and statistically significant correlation we find between the extent of 
liberalization and proportional representation systems. 
Moreover, if we interpret the degree of heterogeneity of the coalition in office as a 
mesure of political competition, our results confirms the arguments that political 
competition may induce political parties in office to adopt those market oriented 
policies which increase economic growth (Besley, 2007; Besley, Persson, and Sturm, 
2010). 
However, our data set does not allow us to fully test empirically the above arguments. 
Futhermore two puzzle arise: why right-wing parties should libralize less than left-
wing ones, under political competition? why left-wing parties liberalize more than 
right-wing ones even in governments characterized by homogeneous coalitions and in 
systems which adopt majoritarian electoral rules? 
 
 
E. LIBERALIZATION AS A ‘NEW’ LEFT-WING POLICY 
 
Finally, we focus on an opposing rationale to the first three (A, B, C) outlined above: 
the observed liberalization wave, rather than being a left-wing crossing of ideological 
cleavages, could be well motivated as a ‘new’ left-wing policy tool aimed at 
maximizing the interests of a left-wing party’s own constituents against right-wing 
adherents.   
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This argument has been recently pointed out by Alesina and Giavazzi (2007), under 
the slogan ‘Economic liberalism is left-wing’. The argument runs that ‘[the] Left 
should learn to love liberalism’, since market-oriented policies imply shifting financing 
from taxpayers to the users themselves and, as such, they tend to eliminate rents and 
to increase productivity. As a consequence, ‘goals that are traditionally held dear by 
the European left – like protection of the economically weakest and aversion to 
excessive inequality and un-earned rewards to insiders – should lead the left to adopt 
pro-market policies’.  
These authors argue that liberalization policies (actually, not only the ones limited to 
network industries) reduce inequality, thus admitting that left-wing governments 
should implement these policies especially when a high level of income inequality is 
observed. Liberalization of network industries is thus deemed as a way to indirectly 
redistribute rents towards final low-income worker-customers, and to grant universal 
access obligations and minimal level of quality (Kwoka, 2005; Armstrong and 
Sappington, 2006).  
However, Alesina and Giavazzi’s argument disregards the real possibility that under 
high income inequality levels, it might be unlikely for a left-wing party to launch 
‘strong’ liberalization programs - unless succeeding in ‘advertising’ these as ‘policy 
reversals’ (Rodrik, 1993; Cukierman and Tommasi, 1998). Precisely because their own 
constituents might be reluctant to sustain policies which might be welfare-improving in 
the long term, but that might be perceived as being certainly detrimental in the short 
term, left-wing parties may abstain from strong ‘liberalization’ under high income 
inequality. How inequality affects the preferences of core constituencies of parties of 
the Left and the Right and, as a result, the policy positions on liberalization adopted by 
parties of the Left and the Right, is crucial here.  
As mentioned above, in a companion paper (Belloc and Nicita, 2010b) we have found 
that the degree of left-wing liberalization is negatively correlated with income 
inequality. We argued that causality is more likely to run from inequality to 
liberalizations of network industries, suggesting that left-wing parties tend to 
liberalize more in less unequal societies, rather than vice versa (Figure 6).  
Our intuition on a positive correlation between inequality and policy polarization is 
confirmed by several studies (Pontusson and Rueda, 2005).                 
Under the assumption that inequality stimulates alignment to ideological cleavages 
and squeezes median voters (Biais and Perotti, 2002), and that rising inequality will be  
  37
associated with more redistribution (Romer 1975; Meltzer and Richard 1980), we 
ascribed our result to a political rationale that induces left-wing parties to ‘polarize’ 
their policies as income inequality grows (thus the opposite of ‘political reversal’). 
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Note: data on income inequality (Gini index) are obtained by World Bank (2009). Both 
liberalization and Gini values refer to 2000. Only countries having a left-wing government in 
2000 are included. Source of the graph: Belloc and Nicita (2010b). 
 
Thus left-wing might decide to liberalize as inequality decreases and not because 
liberalization is a policy tool that reduces inequality. It is worth noticing that in this 
paper, we find a positive and significant effect of per capita GDP on liberalization. 
Given that, a trade-off then might emerge between the economic impact of 
liberalization in reducing income inequality and a left-wing party’s actual incentives to 
adopt ‘strong’ liberalization policies under high inequality. 
The paradox here is that the likelihood of having left-wing liberalization policies will 
be higher precisely when they are needed less in Alesina and Giavazzi’s view, as their 
redistributive impact will be less relevant for a society with lower income inequality. 
All in all, our findings in this paper can neither support nor exclude the argument that 
left-wing parties adopt liberalization as a redistributive policy tool. However if 
liberalization is really deemed to be a left-wing policy, this might explain the divergent 
path we observed in left-wing and right-wing intensity. 
 





According to conventional wisdom, right-wing parties should, in principle, promote 
market-oriented outcomes, as this is embedded in their traditional ideological 
adherences. This prediction has been confirmed by many empirical findings with 
reference to privatization policies. Some recent empirical findings seem to confirm 
these results also for liberalization policies in network industries, arguing that the 
likelihood of liberalization increases under majoritarian rules and right-wing 
governments. 
Firstly, looking at some stylized facts we have argued that these results contrast with 
single-nation case studies, such as Austria, Canada, France, Italy, Mexico and Sweden 
among others, where left-wing governments have significantly introduced 
liberalization in network industries.  
Then we have investigated, through an econometric analysis, whether right-wing 
governments have been more active in adopting liberalization of network industries 
than left-wing ones, and whether homogeneous coalitions and majoritarian systems 
have induced a higher level of liberalization of network industries than heterogeneous 
coalitions and proportional electoral systems have done. Our sample included the 
largest and most updated data set available on 30 OECD countries, provided by the 
latest releases of ETCR economic indicators for the liberalization of seven network 
industries (OECD, 2009) and by political indicators of the World Bank’s Database of 
Political Institutions (World Bank, 2009). This allows us to study a larger group of 
countries with respect to previous empirical studies and to perform the first 
econometric analysis that considers the entire liberalization wave observed in OECD 
countries from the Seventies to date. By so doing, we show that a study of the 
liberalization wave in its entirety reverses the findings reached so far by empirical 
literature on liberalization of network industries. 
Contrary to traditional ideological cleavages, we find that right-wing governments 
liberalize less than left-wing ones. This result is confirmed when controlling for the 
existing regulatory conditions that executives find once elected. 
In particular, in all the model specifications in which we have included the executive’s 
political orientation dummies, we have found that left-oriented governments had a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the observed level of economic  
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liberalization, while right-oriented governments did not show statistically significant 
effects or showed a smaller one. We have found also that EU membership and 
adoption of the euro strongly encouraged liberalization policies.  
 
We believe our findings are relevant in two main respects. 
First, they question the conventional wisdom predicting that all market-oriented 
policies – including liberalization and privatization in network industries – are almost 
exclusively adopted by right-wing governments, as the consequence of traditional 
ideological cleavages for governments’ policy choices. We show not only that left-
wing governments do liberalize network industries, but that they progressively even 
increased the intensity of liberalization over time, in almost all the seven sectors 
studied. On the contrary, right-wing liberalization registered a smooth, but significant, 
decline. This conclusion implies that, for some reasons to be further investigated, 
liberalization of network industries differs from other market-oriented policies in 
terms of its political appeal and rationale. Thus, one first consequence of our 
investigation is that the measurement of political determinants of market-oriented 
policies in network industries should disentangle liberalization and other deregulation 
policies. 
Secondly, our results raise a new puzzle with more general implications for the 
theoretical analysis of the political-economic meaning and extent of liberalization 
policy in network industries: why do left-wing parties in office liberalize, and why do 
they seem to liberalize, on average, to a greater extent than right-wing governments 
do?  
In discussing our results we have, in particular, outlined five main alternative 
rationales for left-wing parties’ liberalization of network industries. These theoretical 
insights have been recalled just to mention some relevant counter-arguments to the 
superficially self-evident thesis that right-wing governments should always maintain 
the same aligned incentives towards privatization and liberalization. We argue that 
existing theoretical arguments regarding political determinants of market-oriented 
policies do not provide unambiguous criteria to support the existence of a clear Left-
Right divide on liberalization mirroring the one theorized and observed for 
privatization.  
To conclude, a comprehensive theoretical framework is still needed in order to 
understand the economic and political rationale, respectively, for right-wing and left- 
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Appendix: main indicators’ description. 
 
TABLE 3. Description of the dependent variable and the government’s ideology variables. 
Variable    Description 
    
Liberalization 
 
We calculate the variable Liberalization by subtracting the OECD’s (2009) entry 
barriers measure from its maximum value. The OECD’s (2009) entry barriers index is 
calculated by OECD as the simple average of seven sectoral indicators that, in turn, 
measure the strictness of the legal conditions of entry in the seven non-manufacturing 
sectors. The OECD’s (2009) sectoral indicators focus on sector-specific aspects of entry 
regulation, as follows. Passenger air transport: the focus is on open skies agreements 
with the USA, regional agreements, and restriction on the number of domestic airlines 
allowed to operate on domestic routes. Telecom: the focus is on the legal conditions of 
entry into the trunk telephony market, the international market, and the mobile market. 
Electricity: the focus is on the conditions of third-party access to the electricity 
transmission grid and on the conditions of the competition in the market for electricity. 
Gas: the focus is on the conditions of third-party access to the gas transmission grid, on 
the share of the retail market open to consumer choice, and on the existence of any 
regulation that restricts the number of competitors allowed to operate in the market. 
Post: the focus is on the existence of any regulation that restricts the number of 
competitors allowed to operate in the national market of basic letter services, basic 
parcel services, and courier activities. Rail: the focus is on the legal conditions of entry 
into the passenger and the freight transport rail markets. Road: the focus is on the 
criteria considered in decisions on entry of new operators. 
Left 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for parties that are defined as social democratic, left-
wing, communist, socialist (source: World Bank, 2008). 
Right 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for parties that are defined as conservative, Christian 
democratic, or right-wing (source: World Bank, 2008). 
Other 
 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for parties that are defined as centrist, and for all those 
cases which do not fit into the above-mentioned categories (e.g. party’s platform does 
not focus on economic issues), or no information (source: World Bank, 2008). 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 